“Conditioned to respond to all the threats…”

INSKEEP: …You start sending arms, how much is enough, because maybe artillery is not going to be sufficient here. Maybe that’s not enough and you end up needing to help coordinate the opposition forces in some way. Maybe that’s not enough and you end up having to send U.S. troops.

DOBBINS: Well, I’m not sure incrementalism makes the most sense. The consensus among all experts is the longer this takes place the worse the aftermath is going to be.

INSKEEP: But how much is going to be enough?

DOBBINS: Well, I think there are two options – they’re not mutually exclusive. One is to provide equipment – arms – to the opposition. And the question there is what kind of arms are they actually capable of fielding and using? The second would be some kind of air intervention. People talk about a no-fly zone, but maybe a simpler task is to simply essentially, overnight, take out the Syrian Air Force on the ground using drones and stealth aircraft. At which point you don’t have to have – enforce a no-fly zone because he doesn’t have anymore airplanes.

Dobbins gives away the farm with this answer.  Not only does he avoid the question, his evasion provides the answer he and others like him believe in, but could never give – it will only be enough when WE (the U.S.) win.  I really wish Inskeep had continued to push for a real answer to a good question.

Later on, the subject of variance of political and religious beliefs among the rebels comes up:

INSKEEP: You just touched on another tough one there, providing arms to the right people. That’s a hard one to figure out, isn’t it?

DOBBINS: It shouldn’t be at this stage. The civil war has been going on two years. We’ve been watching carefully. If the CIA, the State Department don’t know who the right people are now, we’ve got a pretty hopeless Intelligence network.

Um… they do not know who the right people are, James.  Because they do not live there.  Because they do not belong there.

Dobbins later provides an explanation of the mistakes made in the Afghanistan in the 90s.  He also seems to think it is unique, when the reality is that we have a long history of abandoning creepy allies once they outlive their usefulness (e.g. Ho Chi Minh, Saddam Hussein, Hosni Mubarek, etc.).

DOBBINS: It’s certainly an excellent reason not to support an insurgency and then wash your hands of the subsequent situation. The decisive factor in terms of the rise of the Taliban and al-Qaida was the fact that the United States and most of the international community simply walked away and left it to Pakistan and to other more extremist elements to determine Afghanistan’s future in the ’90s.

Or, more simply put, the U.S. generally gets involved where it a) is not wanted and b) does not belong.  But this time will be okay, because we will stick around and help out – like we are doing in Iraq (‘full’ withdrawal December of 2011) and Afghanistan (end of 2014).  But we left Iraq in great shape and Afghanistan will be similar.

INSKEEP: What are the downsides to greater intervention in Syria, for the United States?

DOBBINS: Well, I think there are, you know, political risks that I think way on the administration, as well as the geopolitical risks, which have to do with the deterioration and the relations with the Russians, the possibility that this will lead to a waning of pressure on Iran, as the focus shifted to Syria.

Wow – the one consideration Dobbins has is not that this will turn into another Afghanistan or Iraq – but rather that the focus may shift from Iran (oh, and the Russians might get mad).  Obviously there can never be enough wars for this guy.  I do not know why he is worried about Iran or Russia: the schools, pop culture and the government have been teaching Americans to hate the Persians and Russians for years.